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This work set out to fulfil two principal objectives: to investigate the contribution of the corporate sector with particular reference to the mining sector with its reliance on foreign labour, and thereafter to reflect on civil society’s response to the xenophobic  violence of May 2008. The starting point of this work is the large scale mass mobilization and 
activism of various parts of civil society following the May 2008 xenophobic violence. This paper 
conveys an understanding of the corporate sector’s stance of serious concern about the a situation 
often described as ‘simmering’ and ‘potentially destabilising’ but nonetheless resistant against 
more meaningful interventions by a prevailing sense of pragmatism and a limited and apolitical 
understanding of its role and responsibilities as a key stakeholder in society. It raises broader 
questions about the developmental and transformative responsibilities of corporate capital in South 
Africa vis a viz its compatibility and ‘fit’ with issues of social justice.
This study identified a number of findings:
The response to the xenophobic violence, has helped to create an understanding of the  Ð
comparative advantage of civil society organizations to deliver services at a local level on a short 
term basis.
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The corporate sector response to the xenophobic violence was primarily about short term  Ð
emergency assistance by means of a small number of financial contributions as well as in kind 
donations. 
The xenophobic violence had limited impacts upon the operating environment of business. Ð
The rationale of business for intervention or the lack of it, is related directly to matters of  Ð
pragmatism/self interest and a belief that it is not the mandate of business to intervene.
A general perception exists amongst both civil society and corporate sector stakeholders of the  Ð
limitations of the state as a vehicle for social change and there are serious concerns in both civil 
society and the corporate sector about the efficiencies of state delivery mechanisms.
Civil society’s scope for meaningful partnership with the corporate sector appears to be limited.  Ð
The first section of this paper contextually introduces the changing corporate environment against 
a dynamic socio-political background. It describes the external structural factors which have set the 
background for the combustible mix of factors driving the violence in South Africa. The second section 
draws on the historical legacy of apartheid, current global and economic conditions and the nature 
of the South African transition. The third section describes the corporate response to the violence, 
and shapes the array of views expressed through a number of in-depth interviews, into an analytical 
understanding of the corporate sector’s stance and orientation toward the xenophobic violence. 
Finally the paper concludes with critical reflections on the nature of the relationship between civil 
society and the corporate sector and the possibilities for civil society-business engagement.
Terms of reference
This paper examines the role of business in advancing social justice and transformation and the 
challenges faced by South African businesses in forming the kinds of relationships with civil society, 
labour and the state which would advance and facilitate that goal; as reflected through the lens of 
the xenophobic violence. The work will principally narrate the main forms of the corporate sector 
response to the xenophobic violence. The overall intention is to examine the contribution of the 
corporate sector to the shape and form of the broader response to the violence of May 2008 and to 
reflect on how big business has defined its relationship to issues of development and social justice.
Through the focus on corporate role players, this work looks to discover an analytical understanding 
of the role of business in post apartheid South Africa. The paper looks to the assumed triadic unity 
of state, civil society and business as the basis of necessary collective and sector-based action to 
address xenophobia and its accompanying discontents of anger, frustration, prejudice and violence. 
This paper contends that civil society has functioned in the response to the May 2008 violence as a 
strong independent critic and advocate of the rights and protection of foreign nationals, and that 
government and the corporate sector has played a secondary role to the countervailing power 
and voice of civil society. Key questions relate to the specific role played by the corporate sector; 
an assessment of the quantitative nature of its contributions to the response; and perceptions of its 
role vis a viz social justice or developmental responsibilities. This work is located in wider reflections 
on the role of capital in advancing social justice and democracy in partnership with civil society. It is 
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part of a broader project on xenophobic violence and in concert with other research papers, looks 
to provide the kinds of information that can be translated into policy recommendations or other 
practical actions by stakeholders.
The methodological approach was 3 pronged: (a) an extensive desk top review of all available 
research on xenophobia in South Africa (b) a review of all newspaper and media reports of the 
xenophobic violence and (c) a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with leading 
role players in the response to the violence. This included certain civil society stakeholders such as 
Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), Coalition Against Xenophobia (CAX), Center for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation (CSVR); corporate role players (eg Anglo-American, AngloGold Ashanti, Implats, 
AngloPlat ) and leading business coalitions (eg Business Unity South Africa, Business Leadership, 
NEDLAC, Chambers of Mines). A full list of respondents is provided as an appendix to this paper. 
This paper captures some of the methodological challenges in obtaining data. Key companies 
have been reluctant to provide inputs to an issue which they acknowledge is highly sensitive and 
controversial. Certain corporate bodies have not yet acknowledged the issue onto their institutional 
agendas and remain sensitive to perception. Therefore they declined to input. Many respondents 
have been reluctant to speak without first having had an official position developed by the company 
first. 
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Problems & recommendations
The response of government, civil society and 
the corporate sector was entirely reactive; no 
preparedness or prior awareness 
Institute models of planning and preparedness with 
collective participation of civil society, government and 
business
Differing levels of awareness of the prevalence 
and seriousness of xenophobia and its potential 
for instability and violence
Promote a culture of human rights in South Africa 
(which can be expressed through all stakeholders such 
as government, business and civil society)
The basic difference between each sector; 
logic of each sector pulls in different directions; 
competition vs cooperation; individualism vs 
collective action and mutuality; private vs public 
interests
Initiate a model of merged public/private interest 
Lack of understanding in and between sectors; 
compounded by the lack of collective forums 
for genuine peer interaction between both 
sectors; when business does act, it’s on the basis 
of associations and coalition bodies which do 
not appear to cohere and civil society forums are 
prone to internal divisions and fragmentation.
Institute ‘meaningful’ mechanisms for peer interaction
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is corporate capital and zocial 
justice compatible?
The xenophobic attacks of May 2008 represented a profound shock to many South Africans. To all appearances, the ‘new’ South Africa had appeared to be successfully managing the considerable economic and political challenges associated with entrenched inequality and social divisions. Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s self proclaimed ‘rainbow nation’ had 
successfully secured political stability, neutralized potential conflicts and-most crucially-seemed 
to have successfully defused racial and ethnic tensions. The events of May 2008 appeared to 
fundamentally contradict the self congratulatory basis of the ‘rainbow nation’ and warned of 
systemic dysfunctions indicating profound volatility and instability within the democratic state. The 
monstrous manifestation of this was the xenophobic attacks with its catalogue of human brutality 
against African foreign nationals, including burnings, stabbings, beatings, rapes and wholesale 
looting1.
1 International Organisation for Migration Report (2008) ‘Towards Tolerance, Law and Dignity: Adddressing Violence 
Against Foreign Nationals in South Africa’ Published by International Organisation for Migration Regional Office
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The xenophobic attacks speak in part to a failure of one 
of the most critical challenges of South Africa’s 
democratic dispensation: the delivery of socio-
economic justice for the majority of poor black South 
Africans previously denied access to opportunities and 
resources. 
In the wake of a storm of arguments, assumptions, commentaries and pronouncements about the 
violence, the economics of xenophobia and its structural underpinnings in resource inequalities, 
remain unaddressed. Accordingly, it raises the issue of capital i.e big business, and its transformative 
responsibilities within the context of post-apartheid South Africa, as a way of understanding the 
distributional problems-unequal access to goods, services, opportunities and resources- which 
create enabling conditions for discrimination, prejudice and violence against those perceived to be 
‘foreigners’. 
This paper critically examines the role of business through the lens of the xenophobic violence. The 
corporate sector’s reaction and engagement with civil society’s response to the violence, provides a 
useful starting point toward an understanding of the evolving role of business in post apartheid South 
Africa. Accordingly, it reflects on the expectations placed upon the sector vis a viz understandings 
of what it is able to deliver and possibilities for sustained interaction between business and civil 
society.
The role of corporate South Africa in involvement 
in social justice issues has to be understood against 
competing visions of its role in the struggle 
against apartheid which have been historically assigned 
to it by various sources. 
Liberal adherents pointed to business initiatives on issues such as influx control, trade union 
recognition and various urban reforms. Radical critics argue that big business profited directly from 
apartheid and are able to cite the complicity of corporate South Africa on issues such as racially-
segregated labour, discriminatory work practices and supplying and financing the apartheid state. 
The discourse had only begun to change in the 1970s, possibly in response to the urban unrest 
and skills shortages, which impacted severely on business. In the mid 1980’s, business opened 
up communications with the then-banned liberation movement, ANC, and set in motion the 
establishment of various development foundations and charitable trusts to address issues of 
social responsibility. As apartheid state began to deteriorate due to internal and external pressures, 
business began playing an increasingly prominent role in conceptualising the shape and form and 
developmental path of a proposed ‘new’ South Africa. 
The onset of democracy in 1994 ushered in a new era of legislation, codes of conduct, investment 
initiatives, with direct implications for how companies conducted their business and how they related 
to broader stakeholders within a context of rapid transformation. The new government turned to 
big business as a partner in development and looked to it in order to bolster its lack of capacity 
 The response of The corporaTe secTor To The May 2008 
xenophobic violence 
7
in particular areas such as crime, tourism promotion and inner city development. Unfortunately 
government’s courtship of big business was less than successful. Skepticism and negativity appeared 
to prevail, despite concerted gestures made by President Mbeki to win the trust of big business. 
The uncertain relationship between business and government improved in the form of well known 
business initiatives such as the Business Trust, Business Against Crime and National Business Initiative 
(NBI). The public discourse began increasingly to shift to one of rights and responsibilities, with the 
development of accompanying benchmarks for measuring corporate social responsibilities. 
A particular milestone during this volatile period was the hearings and findings on business of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the late 1990’s2. The TRC found that some sectors colluded 
to a greater extent with the apartheid state, but that business in general bore culpability for having 
participated in and profited by, the apartheid system. Business did not make a full acknowledgment 
of its historic role in supporting apartheid, nor did it propose to make reparations for the past. This 
lack of culpability was compounded by the TRC’s diplomatic approach to rather have business 
contribute to a fund than be forced to make a full disclosure of its broader responsibility. Therefore 
corporate were able to sidestep any real material acknowledgement of its historical role in relation 
to apartheid and its dehumanizing effect on South African society. This assisted in delaying what 
might have been an important national dialogue about the post apartheid social responsibilities of 
big business, as a consequence of the hearings. 
An understanding of the possibilities of the engagement of business with social justice must take 
place located against a dynamic post-1994 socio-political terrain. Frieda Dowie, the director of 
Business Leadership has pointed out that 
the business sector has experienced similar post-apartheid 
reconfigurations and change in much the same way as civil society did3. 
A small number of conglomerates retain their entrenched positions in the economy. Overall the 
sector has experienced certain significant changes: unbundling and diversification of conglomerates; 
shifting of primary listings to overseas stock exchanges and the emergence of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) initiatives4. The sector also had to engage closely with globalising influences 
through relaxing of trade and exchange controls and the subsequent loss of it’s formerly protectionist 
environment. 
Issues of redistribution are key for the sector in the post-apartheid context, particularly given the 
historical complicity of business in maintaining the system of apartheid and its need to demonstrate 
legitimacy to the new dispensation while still protecting and maintaining its own vested interests. 
This location of this new relationship was intended to be a social pact between government, business, 
2 Nattrass, N. (1999) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Business and Apartheid: a critical evaluation African Affairs 
98 pp 373-391
3 Interview with Frieda Dowie, director of Business Leadership, 09/09/09
4 Black economic empowerment (BEE) policy is aimed at enabling the meaningful participation of formerly excluded black 
people in the economic mainstream and de-racialising the white, corporate and industrial-owning class. See Chabane, N 
and Roberts, S. (2006) The Changing Face and Strategies of Big Business in South Africa in Industrial and Corporate Change, 
Vol 15 Issue 3
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labour and civil society, which committed all sectors to work together to create employment, increase 
productivity, stimulate investment and thereafter contribute broadly to growth and stability. 
However the social pact has not enjoyed a wide degree of success. Former President Mbeki’s 
autocratic leadership style has often been cited as the reason for the estrangement of the business 
sector from the social pact. Historical levels of mistrust have beleaguered the relationships between 
the various sectors engaged in the social pact. Government received increasing levels of complaints 
from corporate executives about a seemingly open-ended stream of requests for funds toward 
development programmes. In turn, government complained about an unfounded pessimism on 
the part of business. This led to several heated exchanges between national government and key 
industry leaders. In 2003 a statement by Sasol’s CEO Pieter Cox about the negative impacts of BEE, 
prompted an accusation of ‘bigotry’ from then President Mbeki5. In 2004 Mbeki responded in anger 
to comments from Anglo American Corporation CEO Tony Trahar in the Financial Times about the 
‘political risk’ of investing in South Africa. Again in 2007 Mbeki stated that the business sector was 
‘falling short’6.
BEE may be said to have achieved mixed results. Overall it has not made any substantive difference to 
changing the structures of ownership and control within the economy. The major beneficiaries tend 
to be connected to the ruling party, leading to accusations of ‘crony capitalism’ from various quarters. 
BEE has produced a small class of black millionaires who are less known for socially responsible 
activities, and more rather for excessive consumption and luxury lifestyles. This is in stark contrast 
to the surrounding extremes of poverty and inequality of the majority of the South African black 
population.
Prospects for the success of the social pact, 
appear to be limited. 
In terms of civil society, the corporate sector has been identified as a key stakeholder for engagement 
in order to unlock possible potential for domestic funding. The drive and pressure for civil society 
organizations to become sustainable can be attributed to a number of factors, among the most 
significant being uncertainty about future foreign funding and accordingly, the domestic funding 
limbo. However, this relationship has proved challenging. Despite a reported corporate social 
investment turnover of R4 billion per annum7, there has been a slower growth rate of the relationship 
than one may have imagined. While there is general agreement that the scope for partnership is 
far from exhausted, there also appears to be recognition that the relationship is not necessarily as 
straightforward as early optimistic analyses may have suggested. Historical levels of mistrust and 
uncertainty remain. 
As this study reveals, there is a significant lack of 
insight by both civil society and business about 
the nature and modus operandi of each other, which inhibits 
deeper cooperation. 
5 Southall, R. (2004) Black Empowerment and Corporate Capital in South Africa. Center for Civil Society Report: 1-18
6 Gumede, W.M. (2006) Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the heart and soul of the ANC Zebra Press, Cape Town
7 Trialogue CSI Handbook 2008
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This too has seen complaints from the business sector about the excessive naïve demands for 
funding from both government and civil society circles. 
The relationship between business, civil society and the state is fraught. It begs a broader question of 
the compatibility of business with the demands being placed upon it. Even when there is significant 
agreement regarding broader values such as social justice and sustainable development, there is 
still the barrier of ‘difference’. Business is set up to achieve goals which are generally private in nature, 
primary of which is the profit of shareholders. However a high degree of consciousness is required 
about the sole pursuit of profit, particularly its role in bringing about a more just and equitable 
distribution of wealth in South Africa. If Kgalema Motlanthe’s contention that “capital never behaves 
philanthropically, not at least to the extent that it interferes with its profits”8 is correct, it must then 
call-at the very least- for a questioning of the current version of individualistic and acquisitive 
capitalism, which is embedded in the fabric of South African society.  
8 Motlanthe, K. Speech to the Black Management Forum, September 2004 at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/
speeches/2004
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xenophoBic 
violence: a 
“sleeping dog” III
The role of the corporate sector
We treated the issue of the xenophobic attacks as a sleeping dog that we 
did not want to wake up…9
The xenophobic violence took place against the 
debilitating background of the global economic 
recession. It elicited speculation around the potential for 
economic instability and the impact on business confidence. 
9 Interview with Alan Fine, Public Affairs Manager for AngloGold Ashanti
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In particular, there was fear for the tourism sector ahead of the planned 2010 Soccer World Cup 
and that the violence would deter tourists from other African countries. Moreover, business circles 
expressed anxieties about negative impacts such as production losses, labour shortfalls or lost skills. 
The mining sector in particular was singled out in terms of possible negative impacts.
What happened in reality did not coincide with the anxiety invested in speculation. During the period 
of the outbreak of the xenophobic violence, the rand fell 1.7% but managed to recover rapidly. The 
violence followed a trajectory of short intense bursts, characterized by an extraordinary mobility 
which saw it diffuse to various areas and then to different parts of the country within a relatively short 
space of time. It subsided fairly quickly. However it was able to accumulate a terrible toll of murders, 
injuries, rapes and looting within the limited timeframes of its occurrences. Its greatest impacts 
appear to have been concentrated mainly in the areas of urban townships and informal settlements 
within which the violence occurred. The main sources of negative impacts were a number of smaller 
mines located on the eastern fringe of Johannesburg which reported shortfalls in its predominantly 
Mozambican labour force. This suggests that the violence was not sufficiently widespread enough to 
penetrate top corporate layers. Thus it was possible for the corporate sector to deploy the ‘sleeping 
dog’ approach, as described by gold mining company AngloGold Ashanti. 
A useful starting point as an indicator of the level of corporate involvement in the response to 
xenophobic violence, is media coverage of the philanthropic donations made to the response to the 
violence. Two issues predominate: firstly the plethora of press statements indicating condemnation 
and moral outrage and in many cases, urging or soliciting assistance from other businesses to the 
humanitarian response. See, for eg, the press statement released by Business Unity South Africa 
(BUSA), the representative voice of organized business in South Africa. BUSA’s immediate reaction 
was to undertake a high profile delegation to Alexandra township to assess the situation. Thereafter 
it committed itself to working closely with government on issues of housing, unemployment and 
crime which they saw as critical factors underlying the xenophobic attacks. It declared its intention 
to work on criticisms of organized business regarding employment practices favouring foreign 
nationals at the expense of South Africans. Subsequent research conducted with BUSA indicates 
that this pledge is now fully delegated to NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour 
Council) to be fulfilled.
It is unclear how NEDLAC will fulfil this pledge. NEDLAC is a representative body based in the 
Department of Labour, which brings together organized business, labour and community groupings 
to discuss social and economic policy. However when contacted, NEDLAC confirmed that the 
issue had been brought to its debating chambers out of serious concern on the part of its various 
constituencies but was unable to report on the dialogue. NEDLAC stated it was not responsible for 
how the issue was taken forward by members; that it only provided the environment for the issue to 
be tabled and thereafter discussed but that it could not do any implementation work. 10
10 Telephonic notes with Matshidiso Lithebe at NEDLAC 
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Media information also reveals a small number of 
high-profile financial donations made by 
several major corporations to the humanitarian 
response to the violence. 
One example is Standard Bank which donated R3 million to the humanitarian response with a great 
deal of press fanfare. Cellular communications companies such as MTN and Cell C made donations 
as well as donated free air time to emergency personnel working at the camps set up for the 
humanitarian effort. A R20 million fund to support the humanitarian response was set up by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in partnership with the Independent Development 
Corporation (IDC). This fund was intended to be disbursed by municipalities. However nothing since 
has been heard about the fund. The DBSA also funded an enquiry into the violence, to be carried out 
by the South African Human Rights Commision (SAHRC) and the Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE). However beyond this limited media/press release information, little is known about the 
corporate sector contribution. 
This work established that, within a relatively short space of time, several leading corporates made 
donations to the humanitarian response effort already established by civil society organizations 
with the later intervention of the state. The primary vehicle for accessing and distributing such 
funds from the corporate sector was Tshikululu, the social investment fund used by many South 
African corporates to implement its CSI objectives. Tshikululu was tasked with the responsibility of 
administering funds for the response to the xenophobic violence from a number of companies. Such 
companies included Anglo-American, De Beers, Discovery Health and First National Bank (FNB) and 
WesBank. FNB and WesBank are grouped under the umbrella of the FirstRand Foundation. These 
funds were hastily but efficiently procured, against emergency constraints and urgent time frames. 
It required that normal procedures were circumvented given the emergency nature of the response, 
with only FNB and WesBank having had emergency relief earmarked in their annual corporate social 
investment (CSI) spend.
Tshikululu staff report that the funds they were tasked to distribute, were not earmarked for any 
particular sector or organization. They were responsible for conducting evaluations of the needs at 
particular sites and accordingly reporting back to their clients. They remarked that this was particularly 
challenging, given the chaotic nature of the response and the multiplicity of organizations engaged 
in delivering services11.
11 Interview with F. Witbooi, Tshikululu Client Relationship Manager
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Below is a tabular representation of the sum total of the financial contributions of South African 
corporate companies.
Corporation What company does Form of Intervention
Anglo American Diversified mining and natural 
resources group
R2 million
De Beers Diamond mining company R100 000
FNB National bank R2 million
WesBank National bank R100 000
Standard Bank National bank R3 million
MTN Telecommunications company R100 000 plus airtime for personnel 
working at the camps
Cell C Telecommunications company R100 000 plus airtime for personnel 
working at the camps
Discovery National medical health care provider R75 000
Tabular representation of major corporations financial contributions excluding internal drives for blankets, food and 
clothing for the camps at the level of individual businesses. The latter includes Pick ‘n Pay and Woolworths.
The financial resources tabulated above also exclude the donations that individual companies made 
to leading NGOs such as Gift of the Givers (GOG) and South African Red Cross (SARC). Contributions 
to the response must include the in-kind donations of food, clothing, blankets and other items for 
the camps. Due to the challenges of quantification, particularly so such items remain unaccounted 
for. 
Tshikululu staff contends an opinion that far more funds would have been forthcoming from clients 
if information about the response had been available12. 
However it remains that the sum total of funds 
expended on the xenophobic violence is 
minimal, particularly when juxtaposed against after tax 
profits made by individual companies. 
It begs a comparative perspective in terms of the monies that corporates invest in the form of 
advertising campaigns and public relations initiatives. This includes corporate social investment 
initiatives which also lend to the public relations profile of the companies. One NGO, Gift of the Givers, 
was able to mobilize more in total than a number of major South African corporate companies13. The 
sum of R6 million expended in total by Gift of the Givers lends a sobering perspective to the issue 
of expenditure.
12 ibid
13 Desai, A. (2008) Draft Paper. Responding to the May 2008 Xenophobic Attacks : a case study of Gift of the Givers 
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how did the violence generally 
impact upon business?
Describing the impact of the xenophobic violence on the corporate sector presents a challenge. 
Business is not monolithic or homogenous and therefore companies will certainly often hold 
divergent views about the nature of their intervention or their role in post-apartheid South Africa’s 
transformational agenda. More importantly, the story of corporate capital is not a morality tale of 
good versus evil. It is a story of multiple shades of complexity and understandings of it must resist 
simplistic or uni-dimensional critiques which posit ‘bad’ capital in opposition to ‘good’ civil society. 
This complexity is reflected in methodological challenges confronted by the research. 
The spread of corporate interviewees was limited by 
a serious widespread reluctance to divulge 
information about the response to the violence. 
This may have been due to perceived discomfort 
about the scale of the assistance given to the 
victims of the xenophobic violence, particularly 
when ranked against contributions by other companies. 
It was also acknowledged that the issue of xenophobia was politically sensitive and that until 
companies adopted particular positions toward the issue, interviewees would fear censure from top 
levels. The latter sentiment permeated many of the interviews and led to only a limited number of 
views expressed in this paper. 
In general, the interviewees appeared to cohere in terms of a uniform serious concern about the scale 
and intensity of the violence and its potential impacts upon stability and democracy in South Africa. 
Metaphors such as ‘simmering’ ‘explosive’ ‘potentially destabilising’ ‘disaster waiting to happen’ and 
‘cause for concern’ were commonly used, however there was very little clarity about how to proceed or 
what mechanisms to circumvent further occurrences of violence, should be employed. Respondents 
pointed to the material donations that they were able to mobilize for the response, either through 
monetary donations or time or gifts of food, blankets and clothing. They expressed their belief that 
this form of assistance to the humanitarian response begun by civil society, constituted a necessary 
and important intervention on the part of the corporate sector.
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reference to the mining sector
This section makes specific reference to the mining sector. The industry is symbolic of some of the 
worst miseries wrought by the fusion of capitalism and apartheid, with 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings stating that, “the 
blueprint for ‘grand apartheid’ was provided by the mines and was not an 
Afrikaner state-inspired innovation.”14 
The history of big business in South Africa is inevitably tied in with the discovery of precious metals 
and gold, which principally set up the architecture of dependence on foreign labour. 
A large body of scholarship documents the origins, development and impact of the foreign labour 
system. The mining sector has historically possessed privileged access to foreign labour, a “right” 
denied by the state to other employers. The system was based on the fundamental exploitation of 
cheap disposable black labour and subjected miners to various forms of abuse and dehumanization. 
Miners were housed in massive single sex compounds and paid minimal wages in exchange for 
dangerous, inhumane and unremitting labour. Black unions were prohibited on South African mines 
until as recently as the 1980’s. 
South Africa’s attitude toward Southern Africa has been described as its “‘backyard’ or sphere of 
interest, an exploitable resource, a bottomless source of cheap labour and an easily penetrable 
market for its products.15” The mining industry was able to monopolistically siphon off supplies of 
cheap unskilled labour from the region, with the collusion of the apartheid state which encouraged 
this practice at the expense of local labour in order to ensure maximum profitability. It suited the 
state to embrace the industry’s claim that South Africans were inherently ‘unsuited’ for mine labour 
and that the industry was critically dependent upon foreign labour. 
The practice of monopolistic recruitment from the Southern African region, had several effects 
on the economies of neighbouring countries. It reoriented neighbouring economies away from 
agriculture or subsistence farming and- significantly-toward dependency on the remittances of male 
mine labourers. Moreover, the aggressive destabilization campaign conducted by the apartheid 
state in order to flush out ANC cadres, had the effect of devastating local economies and destroying 
infrastructure. 
Apartheid rule had the curious effect of cementing ties 
of goodwill between its neighbouring countries, 
as well as creating relationships of dependency and 
mutuality amongst them. 
14 Truth and Reconciliation Final Report Volume 4 
15 Daniel, J. Naidoo, V and Naidu, S. (2003) The South Africans have arrived: post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa in 
Daniel, J. Habib, A and Southall, R (eds) State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004, HSRC Press, Cape Town. 
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Such relationships appear to have undergone a process of redefinition in the new post-1994 
dispensation. This may be seen to be related to a number of factors, most significantly the new South 
African state and its failure to incorporate broader regional concerns into its transformational agenda. 
Historical continuities are evident in the way in which African economies are compromised by South 
Africa, which extracts both human and financial capital from Africa and aggressively concentrates it 
in the coffers of South Africa, the continent’s superpower. 
The presence of large numbers of African nationals is not new to South Africa. In 1998 Sally Peberdy 
estimated that foreign labour constituted between 40 and 80% of labour on the South African 
gold mines since the turn of the century16. African nationals have since remained attracted to the 
comparatively large and well developed economy of South Africa, with its perceived promises of 
resources and opportunities.
Hopes and expectations of resources and opportunities have been largely frustrated by the realities 
of the post-apartheid era. The prevalence of xenophobic violence in South Africa bears testimony 
to the failures of the post-apartheid dispensation to deliver the benefits of transformation and 
development to the masses of poor and marginalized South Africans who remain intractably 
disconnected from all forms of economic opportunity. Enclaves of white wealth still maintain their 
privilege and are now joined by a growing elite class of black economic empowerment beneficiaries. 
South Africa’s re-insertion into the global economy after years of apartheid-imposed isolation has 
had the effect of further exposing the distortions and unevenness of capitalist market forces on the 
most vulnerable and marginalized sectors. South Africa continues to attract labour migrants from 
the sub-region and now further afield, but the flow of post apartheid migrants are now no longer 
directed to the mining industry but part of a wider influx to urban spaces in search of economic 
opportunities. 
The result is the fomenting of widespread social discontent through large numbers of African 
nationals competing for economic survival along with the South African poor in townships and 
informal settlements all over the country. 
It therefore stands to reason that 
xenophobia would impact significantly on the mining industry, given its 
high concentration of foreign migrant workers. However it appears that 
the violence did not register at the scale that was feared. 
As an integral part of the national economy, the industry feared that the xenophobic violence would 
create a crisis of confidence amongst international investors. The violence exacerbated an overall 
climate of uncertainty created by the global economic crisis and declining precious metal prices. 
The industry’s coalition body, the Chamber of Mines, reported that it acted swiftly in anticipation of 
negative effects on the industry to contain violence. Its immediate intervention was engagement 
with the labour force to send out a ‘strong message’ that no xenophobic violence would be tolerated 
16  Peberdy, S. (1998) Debating regional immigration policy in South Africa,” in Simon, D. (ed.) South Africa in Southern Africa: 
Reconfiguring the Region, James Currey, David Phillips, Ohio University Press: London
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on the mines. The Chamber of Mines assisted the humanitarian response in affected communities 
through the police and community structures. Its concern was to work with the structures already 
established by the response, and not to create any parallel structures or processes of its own.
As Elize Strydom, Chamber of Mines negotiator states: 
the message was that aggression or violence would be treated as 
misconduct and would carry strong penalties such as dismissal. People 
had to understand that their job would depend on it. In several mining 
communities, women and children who felt threatened, moved onto mine 
premises for protection. Of course this was only a temporary solution and 
we were concerned that these people did not develop any accommodation 
rights in the area. But anyone who pitched up at the mine and needed 
help, got help.17 
Impala Platinum Mines (Implats) reported that it had no experience of xenophobic violence at 
its operations. The company attributes it uncritically to its long standing of policy of ‘dialogical 
intervention’. The latter is based on use of (unpaid) community facilitators who mediate between the 
mine and the communities.
The difference with Implats is that we have historically established really 
good relationships with the community. We have community facilitators 
who keep their ear to the ground and ensure that we know what is 
happening in the community….our mining community is relatively 
peaceful due to specific groupings of African people living in concentrated 
pockets, you have Tswanas living in one group, maybe Mozambicans in 
another group….remember most of them have lived together for years-
they mostly come from the southern African region. They know that the 
strength of one is the total of all of us- and perhaps its only really when 
people from west Africa, say Ugandans and Nigerians, come in, that they 
become nervous…Our practice of dialogical intervention is pretty effective 
in containing tensions and not permitting them to spill over into violence. 
Longer-established mines such as ourselves who ‘dialogue’ regularly 
with their communities, are better equipped to deal with issues such as 
xenophobia than mines that have not been operating long enough for 
communities to learn to work with and trust one another.18
17 Interview with Elize Strydom, negotiator for Chamber of Mines
18 Interview with Pierre Lourens, spokesperson for Impala Platinum Mines
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Most mining company respondents reported a negative effect on operations. Immediate impacts 
of the violence tended to be concentrated in smaller mines on Johannesburg’s East Rand such as 
Pamodzi Gold (since liquidated), ERPM (since closed down) and DRD Gold (refused to comment). 
These mines experienced a high degree of absenteeism and accordingly, lost production, as a result 
of the xenophobic violence.
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) report that none of its members had been affected by the 
violence19. This is despite a particularly violent incident in Tembisa, a large township on the East Rand, 
in which a NUMSA shop steward was brutally murdered. The NUMSA shopsteward Walter Ntombela 
and a fellow Zimbabwean were stabbed to death and beheaded before his shack was set alight. 
Walter Ntombela had been a member of the union for ten years20. 
AngloGold Ashanti’s response was self consciously pragmatic: 
Our response was a pragmatic one, we knew something was happening 
but in areas at some distance from our operations and we knew we 
had to monitor it closely and be ready to deal with it if it infiltrated our 
operational world. We treated the issue of the xenophobic attacks as a 
sleeping dog that we did not want to wake up. So we did some active 
things, we monitored the situation, we monitored the media carefully…
all in all, it was a fairly nervous time and quite unpredictable…we had two 
choices, go out and talk about it in concert with organized labour or just 
watch it and keep quiet. We did the latter.21
It can be said that while there is genuine concern for the issue of xenophobic violence on the part of 
the corporate sector, it is coupled with a generalized recognition of the risk factor that xenophobic 
violence presents to its own operating environment. This risk appears to be calculated on the basis 
of the interests of business rather than any considerations of costs to stability, peace and democracy 
in the country. 
In other words, it appeared to be a ‘business 
as usual’ approach unless its interests were 
directly threatened. This approach shows a 
similarity of approach to the modus operandi 
of business in South Africa in opposition to 
apartheid. Its intervention was in response to a threat to 
its own interests. 
19 Interview with Glenn Mpufane conducted by Mondli Hlatshwayo
20 Polzer, T. (2008) Forced Migration Project database of recorded xenophobic attacks
21 Interview with Alan Fine, Public Affairs Manager for AngloGold Ashanti
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other corporate voices
There appeared to be a prevailing sense of misplaced responsibility amongst several corporate 
respondents. It was felt that government should take the lead in mounting a full scale response 
to the issue of xenophobia and its potential to destabilize the economy and compromise nation-
building and democracy. It was also felt that there are natural limits on the ability of business to play 
a decisive political role. As Frieda Dowie, director of Business Leadership explained, 
The role of government is critical. People do not understand that there has 
to be delivery on the part of the top structures of government. Business 
often finds that it does so much and then there is a certain point at which 
at which its work is stopped at a political level and it can go no further. 
When exactly does business withdraw and when does government do 
what it is supposed to do?22 
Moreover, the state was seen to be better placed to respond to the violence than any other sector. 
Francois Witbooi, client relationship manager at Tshikululu Social Investments, CSI fund managers 
for many leading South African corporations, questioned the role of government and accordingly 
government’s ability to respond to issues of need through its delivery mechanisms: 
My feeling is that a lot of clients would have loved to contribute but frankly 
they didn’t have the know-how. Where was the information? It’s not the 
corporate sector’s job to find out. It was clear that government didn’t 
know what to do and this caused a lot of confusion. Corporate budgets 
certainly do not compete with those of government. Government’s 
inability to manage funds is a real problem. Hence we have the withdrawal 
of the Global Fund for Aids, it took US$41million (the first installment of 
US$165 million over five years) out of the country. Themba Lesizwe got 
handed back to the UN. Look at the Lottery and the NDA. Where exactly is 
government at?23
22 Interview with Frieda Dowie, director of Business Leadership
23 Interview with Francois Witbooi, Tshikululu Client Relationship Manager
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As Bobby Godsell states, 
There is a widespread notion that money makes itself. Governments 
seem to think that businesses make money automatically-that we have 
infinite budgets. Yet, like cabinet ministers, we can only do what has been 
budgeted for24.
It is commonly accepted that business and civil society generally have oppositional aims and 
objectives. It may well appear that each set of stakeholders is compelled to further its own agendas 
rather than work constructively to support the public interest. A generalised finding is that the 
corporate sector engaged from a safe distance with the response to the xenophobic violence and 
exercised caution and pragmatism in its approach. Many companies had initiated internal drives 
urging employees to donate and accordingly placed boxes in their premises for staff to drop their 
donations, which was then transported to various site locations. However beyond short term 
attention to the crisis in the form of material assistance, the corporate sector’s approach was minimal 
and in this way it distinguished itself fundamentally from the civil society sector which responded 
immediately with both material assistance but also a strong lobbying and advocacy voice. 
It appears that the sector’s response was mediated by (a) direct self interest as in it would intervene 
only when the xenophobic violence was clearly seen to present a threat to the operating environment 
of business operations (b) an understanding that business does not have either the mandate or the 
responsibility to ‘act’ (c) a generalized lack of understanding about what was expected of business. 
The drivers of corporate behavior are complex. They are usually based less on simple altruism than 
the broader expectation that the benefits will exceed the costs. Bobby Godsell is the chairman of 
BUSA and the chief executive of AngloGold Ashanti. He argues, 
Business is an analytical category, not a moral concept. Most people 
talk of business, labour and government as if they were similar concepts. 
Government is a relatively coherent entity; labour has social cohesion-an 
injury to one is an injury to all-but the real unit of business is the individual 
firm. A business’s fundamental goal is to be competitive; though there 
are islands of co-operation between one business and the other. To put it 
succinctly-socialists have all the good songs; labour has the t-shirts but it’s 
hard to find a capitalist slogan that will get people onto the barricades. Yet 
capitalism is a good way of organizing economic activity.25
24 Interview with Bobby Godsell in Building the Nation-a Business Contribution (2008)
25 ibid
 The response of The corporaTe secTor To The May 2008 
xenophobic violence 
21
The idea that business is distinguished primarily by its financial bottom line is echoed by Alan Fine, 
Public Affairs Manager for AngloGold Ashanti:
 Why is it that corporations should even have a view about the issue of 
xenophobic violence? I am always surprised that people seem to expect 
that a corporation should have a ‘view’ as such. We chose to deal with the 
issue of the xenophobic violence in a pragmatic way. For us, it was simply 
an operational issue and not a social-sociological issue.26
It may be said that social justice is at odds with the fundamental logic of business. This sense of 
a fundamental difference between both sectors is borne out by corporate imagery capturing 
conditions in the camps. Appendix III and IV illustrates AngloGold Ashanti’s depiction of their 
corporate donation to the camps. The imagery of contented children and well-equipped tents, 
contradict actual conditions on the ground of resource scarcity and desperation. 
The differences in how business and civil society responded to the xenophobic violence, are aptly 
illustrated not only by how social development or transformation is achieved but the pace by which 
it is attained. As Godsell states, 
Unfortunately many social objectives are denominated in time scales 
that are not convenient for businessmen or politicians. Businesses have 
reporting periods and politicians have election cycles. It will, for example, 
take a generation to improve the quality of South African education.27
Development is often messy, complex and conflicted and accordingly moves at a much slower pace, 
unlike the logic of business whose natural imperative is to grow to scale and achieve maximum 
growth in a short period of time. This often means that business looks to short term material gains, 
not the long term structural shifts in values, relationships and power dynamics which drive systemic 
change and social transformation. 
26 Interview with Alan Fine, Public Affairs Manager for AngloGold Ashanti
27 Interview with Bobby Godsell in Building the Nation-a Business Contribution (2008)
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conclUsion: 
‘BUsiness as 
UsUal’IVppartart
Ultimately this work does not add very much 
new or even encouraging information to our 
understanding of the potential for capital to be 
socially responsive in a meaningful way. 
It confirms what may have been already been common knowledge: that the overall response to the xenophobic violence had strengths as well as weaknesses, civil society over-extended itself in response to the state’s inability to manage the crisis, and that the response of thee corporate sector was ‘business as usual’. This work also speaks encouragingly to a positive outcome for 
civil society in that it is able to keep issues of social justice on the national agenda. This shows that the 
liberal concept of civil society as a bulwark against the state, has strong relevance in South Africa.
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Several key insights are evident regarding the role of the corporate sector in the response to the 
xenophobic violence. Firstly 
this work captures the puny scale of the corporate sector’s contribution to 
the response, but also a sense of the shallowness of its engagement in the 
terrain of social justice. When measured against other sectoral responses, it 
must indicate a strong deficit in commitment to issues of social justice and 
transformation in South Africa. 
This work confirms the 
lack of any creative imagining on the part of business to have offered any 
non-monetary resources. 
If the question is posed of whether there is space for an alliance or cooperative relationship between 
business and civil society, it must acknowledge the issue of what each sector can bring to the table. 
It is possible for business, government and civil society to have worked together effectively in the 
response to the violence. It may well be imagined that corporate participation may have been capable 
of providing the managerial and technical know- how and expertise to enable all the stakeholders in 
the response to operate in a more synergistic-and therefore effective-fashion. 
This work advocates deepened and renewed 
cooperation between civil society and the 
corporate sector. 
Evidence from earlier sections highlights the need for civil society to engage with the market 
and, for substantive capacity boosts to build alliances and networks, mobilize diverse categories 
of citizens and undertake advocacy under limited political spaces. How well civil society is able to 
address these challenges depends on its ability to strengthen itself and achieve autonomy and 
sustainability. Similarly the corporate sector must be able to deepen and entrench its roots in the 
society from which it extracts, extending and expanding its linkages with other sectors, and also 
taking on a more integrated approach to development which involves the state and its citizens as 
equal stakeholders.
There is an uncritical aspect to the discussions or debates by both sectors. Issues of power and 
structural change-drivers of social transformation-are largely missing from. The ‘business as usual’ 
approach belies the reality of economic injustice. In studying the responses by both sectors to the 
xenophobic violence as well as the issue of xenophobia itself, the differences in basic orientation 
between both sectors become pronounced. Civil society concepts of collective action, public interest 
and mutual cooperation stand in opposition to the competition, individualism and primacy of private 
interests which underlie the logic of business. They are not willing to enter the political terrain but 
indirectly and only in ways which advance their own interests. These are deep-rooted differences 
but it begs the question of whether they are also irreconciliable, given that options for meaningful 
collaboration are largely absent from the agenda of both sectors. This work recommends that the 
latter be prioritized.
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appendix iii
AngloGold Ashanti employees donating supplies to a temporary camp in Midrand, Gauteng
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appendix iv
AngloGold Ashanti employees donating blankets to a temporary camp in Midrand, Gauteng
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appendix v
List of Interviews conducted in person
Institution Interviewee Interviewee 
Designation
Date
AngloGold Ashanti
76 Jeppe Street
T: 011 637 6000
Mr. Alan Fine AngloGold Ashanti, 
Public Affairs 
Manager
10/09/09
APF (Anti Privatisation 
Forum)
Dr. Dale McKinley Activist and 
development 
consultant
20/07/09
BUSA
3 Gwen Lane
Sandton
Jhb
T: 011 784 8000
F: 086 652 1214
Mr Kganki Matabane BUSA 
Transformation 
Director
10/09/09
Business Leadership
3 Rockridge Road
Parktown, Jhb
T: 011 356 4650
F: 011 726 4705
Ms. Frieda Dowie Director of Business 
Leadership
09/09/09
CoRMSA
23 Jorrisen Street
5th floor
Braamfontein Center
Jhb
T: 011 403 7560
F: 011 403 7559
Mr. Duncan Breen CoRMSA 
programme officer
14/07/09
CSVR
23 Jorissen Street
Braamfontein Center
Jhb
T: 011 403 5640
F: 011 339 6785
Ms. Nomfundo Mogapi Head of CSVR’s 
Trauma Clinic
12/08/09
Impala Platinum Mines
2 Fricker Road
Illovo
Jhb
T: 011 731 9000
F: 011 731 9524
Mr. Pierre Lourens Implats Mine 
Manager
21/09/09
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MSF or Doctors without 
Borders
79 Pritchard Street
Jhb
T: 011 403 4440
Ms. Bianca Tolboom Nurse 05/08/09
Sonke Gender Justice
41 de Korte Street
Sable Center
Jhb
T: 011 339 3589
F: 011 339 6503
Mr. Jean Pierre Kalala Researcher 06/08/09
Tshikululu Social 
Investment Fund
28 Harrison Street
Marshalltown
T: 011 377 7300
F: 011 834 3682
Mr. Francois Witbooi Client Relationship 
Manager
10/07/09
Tshikululu Social 
Investment Fund
28 Harrison Street
Marshalltown
T: 011 377 7300
F: 011 834 3682
Ms. Deepa Patel Senior CSI 
Practitioner
10/07/09
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List of Telephonic Interviews
Institution Interviewee Interviewee 
Designation
Date
Anglo American 
44 Main Street
Johannesburg
T: 011 638 9111
F: 011 638 0112
Mr. Pranill Ramchander Spokesperson 15/08/09
Anglo Platinum
55 Marshall Street
Johannesburg
T: 011 373 6317
F: 011 373 6318
Mr Simon Thobela Spokesperson 08/09/09
NEDLAC
14a Jellicoe Avenue
NEDLAC House
Rosebank
T: 011 328 4200
F: 011 447 6053
Ms. Matshidiso Lithebe Development 
Chamber 
Coordinator
08/09/09
Chamber of Mines
5 Hollard Street
Johannesburg
T: 011498 7100
F: 011 834 1884
Dr. Elize Strydom Negotiator 21/09/09
Pamodzi Gold
Eastgate Office Park
2nd Floor
Bruma
T: 011 417 5960
Office of Graham 
Chamberlain
Pamodzi Mine 
Manager
15/09/09
DRD Gold
299 Pendoring Ave
Randburg
T: 011 219 8700
F: 011 476 2637
James Rair Investor Relations 14/09/09
NUM
7 Rissik Street
Johannesburg
T: 011 377 2000
F: 011 377 2001
Glenn Mpufane
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